1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

oned without trial, and their property was confiscated.[55] With some 200 Chungking men out of the way, General Sheng, according to one report, "asked Generalissimo Stalin to incorporate Sinkiang into the Soviet Union. The Russian leader, who evidently had had quite enough by this time, refused. Chungking also had had enough, and decided to remove General Sheng by a delicate operation."[56]

General Chu Shao-liang was again sent to Urumchi, and persuaded Sheng Shih-ts'ai to leave Sinkiang and accept the post of Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in Chungking. (Under the Kuomintang, this Ministry had become a sinecure for men out of power, because of its inability to do anything challenging the interests of the landlords who had increasingly gained control over the Kuomintang.) On September 2, 1944, the provincial *Hsinchiang Jih Pao* published the news that Sheng had been transferred to Chungking, and on September 11 he departed from Urumchi airfield. His reign was over.

Breakdown of Chinese Frontier Policy

Yang Tseng-hsin, Chin Shu-jen, and Sheng Shih-ts'ai had one after another established themselves as the rulers of Sinkiang, and had then been "recognized" by the National Government. After the deposition of Sheng, on the other hand, the National Government was able to name four men in succession as its own appointees to the post of Chairman of the Provincial Government. These men were Wu Chung-hsin, Chang Chih-chung, Masud Sabri and Burkhan. The constrast shows that since 1944 Sinkiang has once more come within the orbit of Chinese national politics.

After the surrender of Japan in 1945 the C.C. Clique and the Political Science Group became the main sources of Chinese national policy in Sinkiang. The C.C. Clique — the "Tammany" of

[55] *Han Hai Ch'ao* (*Tides of the Dry Sea*, or *Desert Tides*), Urumchi, January, 1947, p. 19; also Shanghai edition of the same date, p. 21 (in Chinese).

[56] Dispatch from Christopher Rand, dated Urumchi September 22, 1947, in *New York Herald Tribune*, September 23, 1947.

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

*175 665 the Kuomintang, controlling more political machinery and more key appointments than any other faction — was known for its impatient policy of direct repression, and its preference for the use of force in extirpating any challenge to its supremacy. Its strength came from the brothers Ch'en Kuo-fu and Ch'en Li-fu, nephews of an early political patron of Chiang Kai-shek and confidential secretaries to the Generalissimo who helped to engineer his original rise to power. The Political Science Group — made up of experienced bureaucrats and administrators, with something of the subtlety and refinement of the old mandarinate — preferred moderation whenever possible.

Both factions, however, required a strong military leader as a pivot around which to revolve, and both always revolved around Chiang Kai-shek. They have been used by him, at his discretion, in alternating phases of policy. They represent different expressions of the Confucian tradition that the function of officials is not to represent the people but to rule over them. Despite the friction of rivalry between them they held basically the same view with regard to minority peoples within the Chinese realm: these peoples are not entitled to equal representation in a Chinese federation, but should be ruled over by the Chinese.

*175 642 This view differs from that of Sun Yat-sen, who definitely recognized the Moslem Turkis (the Uighurs) in Sinkiang as a distinct nationality. According to Article Four of his National Reconstruction Program, and also the Declaration of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang in 1924, all such "nationalities" in China are entitled to self-determination. Sun Yat-sen only developed this view fully at the very end of his life, almost certainly under the influence of Russian and Chinese Communist advisers, and probably under the influence of the successful example of the Soviet policy toward national minorities. After the death of Sun Yat-sen, however, this approach was abandoned by the Kuomintang. Even Kuomintang members who recognized the distinct nationality of such peoples as the Uighurs had no policy providing for self-determination in practice. The narrowest

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

writer. From Lanchow along the "panhandle" of Kansu, across the main desert gap and on to Urumchi, the distance is nearly 2000 miles. Yet a blockhouse was maintained about every twenty miles along the route. Supplies and transport were kept moving only by heavy requisitions in kind and in labor from the sparse population. The troops, who themselves were not well treated, were not under good discipline, and when turned loose they treated the people even worse.[62]

Chinese colonization has resulted in the addition of very few owner-cultivators. Many famine refugees have died even after their arrival in Sinkiang, and in the cities and towns there has been a great increase in the number of beggars and thieves.[63] Heavy taxation and inflation stimulated bitter hatred against the Chinese, accompanied by much resentment even among Chinese against the political regime. As one American reporter observed, "to save Sinkiang, China would have to make spectacular reforms on a scale unknown in the Orient. But even if this were possible and if it were done, China's efforts might break down against the barrier of emotion" — meaning the aroused nationalism of the Uighurs.[64]

In the rivalry for power in Sinkiang in the last years of Kuomintang rule, the C.C. Clique had the upper hand over the Political Science Group most of the time. It was able to use, in succession, an old-line bureaucrat like Wu Chung-hsin, a general like Chang Chih-chung, and a wealthy Uighur landlord member of the Kuomintang like Masud Sabri.

Wu Chung-hsin, long associated with the C.C. Clique, long active in frontier affairs, and long distrusted by Mongols and Tibetans, was appointed provincial Chairman in October 1944. Though a graduate of the Paoting Military Academy, his most important posts had been in the Civil Service. He was Governor of Anhui, his native province, in 1929, Governor of Kweichow

[62] Chung Shih, "The Puzzle in Sinkiang," in *Min Chu* (*Democracy*, weekly), Shanghai, March 16, 1946, Nos. 21–22 joint issue (in Chinese).

[63] Ch'en Ssu-ying, "Agriculture in Sinkiang," in *Central Bank Monthly*, New Series, Vol. 1, No. 6, Shanghai, June, 1946 (in Chinese).

[64] Frank Robertson.

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

*175 665 from 1935 to 1937, and Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission from 1938 to 1944. During this period he headed an important and personally profitable mission to Tibet, and supported a land-grabbing colonization policy which did much to turn Inner Mongolian nationalism against China.

His appointment in Sinkiang was backed by General Chu Shao-liang, who has already been mentioned, who was then active on behalf of the C.C. Clique. The most important members of his staff were also members of the Clique, including Tseng Shao-lu, Secretary-General; Teng Chiang-hai, Civil Affairs Commissioner; Yu Tao-yun, Reconstruction Commissioner; and Hsü Lien-chi, Educational Commissioner. Only his Finance Commissioner, Lo Yo-wen, was an adherent of the Political Science Group.

*175 669 By the end of November 1944 Wu had set free most of the Chungking appointees who had been arrested by Sheng Shih-ts'ai;[65] but many prisoners who had no connections with the C.C. Clique or with Chungking remained in jail, and much confiscated property was not returned. Political refugees who had fled to a number of cities in China, and even to Mecca, India, and Afghanistan, were not allowed to return. The passport fee for a merchant leaving the province was first trebled and then multiplied by ten.[66] Inflation and corruption increased to the point where the saying became current in Sinkiang that "one Sheng Shih-ts'ai went out, but two came in."

Opposition to the new trend in Chinese rule was not long in crystallizing. A rebellion broke out in the Ili Valley in November 1944. Fighting lasted for more than forty days, until Chinese forces gave up the city of Kulja and withdrew. This rising, referred to in the Chinese political literature as "the Ining Affair," marked the opening of a new phase of nationalism in Sinkiang.

A regime calling itself the Eastern Turkistan Republic was set up at Kulja, headed by a council of three — an Uighur, a Kazakh,

[65] Yu Han, "Sinkiang Memoir," in *Tu Chih Wen Chai* (*Reader's Digest*), Shanghai, July 16, 1946, Vol. 1, No. 6 (in Chinese).

[66] *Hsin Wen Tsa Chih* (*News Miscellany*), No. 8, Chungking, March 15, 1946 (in Chinese). Under Sheng, the passport fee had been $150,000 (Chinese). By 1946 it had increased to $2,000,000.

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

found myself not in accord with the minority over a question, I always settled the difference either by negotiation or by concessions. For this reason, a false impression has been created among outside circles that we were too weak and permitted the group led by Vice-Chairman Akhmedjan to control everything." [79] This reference to unfriendly criticism may well have been intended for the C.C. Clique, with which General Chang had to contend on the one hand while negotiating on the other hand with the non-Chinese nationalists.

Compromise was, in fact, the policy of realism at this time. At the end of 1946 the National Government troops, over which Chang had some degree of authority, though not the authority of actual command, were unable to push beyond the Manass River. Products from west of the Manass, including gold, oil, coal, grain, flour, meat, and hides, were not coming into the Urumchi region. Most of the Uighur leaders, including many in the Tarim Basin, were still demanding that Nanking punish Sheng Shih-ts'ai.[80] They were unaware, presumably, that Sheng had already purchased immunity by his enormous gift of gold to the Kuomintang treasury.

Against the realistic moderation of Chang stood the intransigence of the C.C. Clique. Its influence had penetrated into Sinkiang as early as 1942, when Sheng Shih-ts'ai was beginning to shift from reliance on Russia to dependence on the Kuomintang. By January 1943 a provincial headquarters of the Kuomintang and a branch of the Central Political Training Institute, both controlled by the C.C. "machine," had been established at Urumchi. By the end of 1946 there were more than 2000 graduates of the Political Training Institute; and early in 1947, when the first provincial congress of Kuomintang delegates was held, a Sinkiang membership of 50,000 was claimed.[81] As soon as General Chang became Chairman, branches of the Kuomintang (San Min Chu I)

[79] Speech by Chang Chih-chung, published in *Hsinchiang Jih Pao (Sinkiang Daily)*, August 14, 1947 (in Chinese).

[80] *Ta Kung Pao*, Shanghai edition, November 16, 1946 (in Chinese).

[81] *Hsinchiang Jih Pao (Sinkiang Daily)*, Urumchi, March 1, 1947; also *Han Hai Ch'ao (Desert Tides)*, Urumchi, January 1947 (both in Chinese).

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

Youth Corps were set up at Urumchi, Aksu, and Kashgar. The C.C. Clique member controlling all of these activities was Ch'en Hsi-tseng, who was able to count on co-operation not only within the Provincial Government but on the part of the garrison commander and the police.

Whereas Chang Chih-chung had no strong staff of his own, the C.C. membership penetrated all political ranks. In spite of the unpopularity of the Chinese, it was able to recruit members among all non-Chinese nationalities through its ability to open the way to public office. The Clique has never hesitated to use graft as an auxiliary to party organization, and accordingly in Sinkiang, as elsewhere in China, its party officers and magistrates and military officers affiliated with it have been accused of organized corruption.[82] Organized association with gangs is also widely attributed to the C.C. Clique, especially for the purpose of breaking up elections and popular meetings. Among "incidents" attributed to the C.C. Clique were the murder of a government delegate at Emin, near Chuguchak, in November 1946; a big riot in Urumchi in February 1947, in which five were shot and many wounded; and riots in Turfan, Toksun, and Shanshan during July 1947. The pattern follows that long established by the C.C. Clique in China, down to the detail of having such incidents reported in controlled newspapers in such a way as to imply that the blame for them lay on the Uighurs and other non-Chinese.[83]

With a deteriorating situation in China itself, Chang's policy of moderation and compromise in Sinkiang was bound to appear more and more like a policy of temporizing, and to seem, to the non-Chinese peoples of Sinkiang, more like a reluctant retreat

[82] Detailed accusations in *Observer* (weekly), Shanghai, March 22, 1947 (in Chinese).

[83] See editorial in *Hsinchiang Jih Pao* (*Sinkiang Daily*), Urumchi, July 1, 1947 (in Chinese); also article by Chang Chi-yun (member of the C.C. Clique), in *Ta Kung Pao*, Tientsin edition, September 21, 1947 (in Chinese). The other side is given in a manifesto of Chinese in the Chuguchak district (under control of the Kulja dissidents), denouncing the Chinese riot of February 1947 in Urumchi, published in the Chinese edition of *Ta Cheng Min Sheng Pao* (*Justice and the People's Livelihood*), Chuguchak, April 30, 1947.

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

ences among these "stocks" are limited to habits, customs, religious beliefs, and geographical environment, and do not include race or blood. "In short," he says, "the various stocks in China constitute not only one nation but also one race." [7]

The generalized statements about race and nation made in *China's Destiny* have been applied to the nationality problems of Sinkiang by a writer belonging to the Kuomintang C.C. Clique, a tightly organized political machine whose political creed was to give extreme authoritarian interpretations of every opinion or theory uttered by Chiang Kai-shek. Following his terminology, the C.C. theorist divides the peoples of Sinkiang into fourteen "stocks." He then concludes that since they are not separate nationalities but merely "stocks" of a single "nation," therefore they are not entitled to separate political recognition, a thesis which other writers have extended into the cultural field as well. He proposes that "self-government" in Sinkiang should be based on small geographical units, the counties, regardless of differences between the peoples inhabiting these administrative units. In order to make impossible any other interpretation of the term for "self-government," he rejects, in so many words, the identification of "self-government" with "freedom" or "independence." [8]

In contrast to the rigidly assimilative approach of the C.C. extremists is the policy adopted by Sheng Shih-ts'ai when he was military dictator of Sinkiang. After the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 Sheng took into his administration a National Salvationist who appears to have been instrumental in elaborating for him a policy intended to effect a compromise between the Chinese monopoly of the provincial administration and the stirrings of nationalism among the non-Chinese peoples.

The National Salvationists in China at that time represented a point of view rather than a political organization. In face of the emergency created by the Japanese danger they believed in effecting the widest possible political coalitions and in taking the

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 13. The Chinese term for "nation" or "nationality" is *min-tsu*, and for "stock," *tsung-tsu*, also often translated as "clan."

[8] *Cf.* articles by Li Tung-fang in *Altai*, I, No. 2, Chungking, April 25, 1945, pp. 8–9 and pp. 15–18.

1: Lattimore [illegible] (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

829 *563 665 stress off all political cleavages, from the great cleavage between the Kuomintang and the Communists down to all minor factional quarrels. The National Salvationist point of view was thus well suited to the attempt to create a harmonious wartime morale in Sinkiang.

829 114 *563 In line with the National Salvationist influence in his entourage, General Sheng proclaimed a program of "Six Great Policies." [9] Under one of the policies the peoples of Sinkiang were officially classified as belonging to fourteen "nationalities." These, listed in the order of the documents of the period, are as follows:

Chinese	202,239	Taranchi	41,307
Manchu	670	Tatar	4,601
Mongul	63,018	Kirghiz	65,248
Moslem (Dungan)	92,146	Uzbek	7,966
Uighur	2,900,173	Sibo	9,203
Kazakh	318,716	Solon	2,489
Tajik	8,867	Russian	13,408

The criteria for this classification are not clear. The admiring translator of the admiring adviser of Sheng Shih-ts'ai comments that the confusion in criteria is such as "would tend to eliminate this as any 'scientifically' worked out ethnic list." [10] Nor can it be based on geographic criteria, for the groups are not delimited on a territorial basis. It is not based on economic criteria, for some of the groups consist of pastoral herdsmen and others of sedentary cultivators. It is not based on religious criteria, for only the Chinese-speaking Moslems are listed as "Moslems," while followers of other religions are not mentioned as such, and other Moslems, such as the Uighurs, are not identified by religion. It is not based on administrative criteria, for Sinkiang is divided into ten administrative areas which cut across the fourteen groups. It is not based, finally, on any observable combination of these criteria.

[9] See Chapter III.

[10] Martin R. Norins, *Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang*, New York, John Day, 1944, p. 91.

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

complete Communist demarcation of the nationalities in Sinkiang. Nor does there seem to be, in the Chinese Communist literature, any discussion of the administrative units under which a federative nationality policy could operate. However, a general policy for the multinational Republic of China was proposed by the First All-China Congress of Soviets in 1930 in the following resolution:[14]

> ". . . In such regions as Mongolia, Tibet, Sinkiang, Yunnan and Kweichow, in which a majority of the population belongs to another, non-Chinese nationality, the toiling masses of these nationalities have the right to determine by themselves whether they want to secede from the Chinese Soviet Republic and form their own independent state, or to join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or to form an autonomous region of the Chinese Soviet Republic.[15]

The Chinese Communists have since abandoned their Soviet regime in favor of what they call "the New Democracy," but their policy toward national minorities does not appear to have undergone basic modification. Speaking before the 1945 Congress of the Communist Party, Mao Tze-tung said that the Chinese "demand better treatment for the national minorities of China, according them the right of self-determination and of forming a union with the Hans [Chinese] on a voluntary basis." Mao's failure to repeat the earlier offer of the right of secession may indicate that he has foremost in mind a union of national states under the formula of a "Union of Democratic Republics."[16]

[14] *The Soviets in China*, Moscow, 1933, p. 440 (in Russian).

[15] In this resolution the Chinese Communists declared for the principle of the right of secession. In his speech of August 24, 1945, recognizing the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic, Chiang Kai-shek also recognized the right of secession, not only for the Mongols but also for other non-Chinese minorities — a striking modification of his views expressed in *China's Destiny* and elsewhere. Thus on the right of secession President Chiang and the Chinese Communists were within reach of at least verbal agreement. Other Chinese assimilationists, and the "Pan-Turkic" nationalists, have not conceded the right of secession.

[16] Mao Tze-tung, *The Fight For a New China*, New York, 1945, pp. 35 and 44.

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

*563
665
186

The necessity for some sort of federal arrangement is evidenced by the constant armed rebellions resulting from the suppression of local nationalism. The Kulja movement referred to in Chapter III was a rebellion of this kind. It had special significance in the fact that it split the Uighur nationalist movement into two main sections. One section, led by Governor Masud Sabri, and by Burkhan, Mohammed Emin, and Isa Beg, all well-to-do leaders in the Uighur community, took the Chinese side against the Kulja movement. Another group, in which Akhmedjan played a prominent part, supported the Kulja program against the Chinese and their followers. The split between the two groups occurred in August 1947.

That section of the Uighur leadership which most closely identified itself with the Chinese went farthest in the direction of the Turkic nationalism described earlier in this chapter. The Uighur supporters of the Kulja movement found this Turkic nationalism to be an obstacle to their co-operation with other groups. On one occasion Akhmedjan went to some pains to convince the Kazakh supporters of the Kulja coalition that, far from being slighted by the Uighurs, they were receiving more than a proportional share in the coalition.

Although the leaders of the Kulja movement made plain their opposition to the policies of Uighur nationalists like Masud Sabri they did not present an equally clear picture of their own nationalist ideas and objectives. A particularly important point about which full information is lacking is the extent to which their opposition to earlier Chinese rule in Sinkiang led them to accept the federal proposals advanced by the Chinese Communists. It appears that in the early phase of the Kulja revolt the insurrectionists may have had the objective of full independence, as indicated by their use of the term "East Turkistan Republic." After the signing of the Kulja Agreement the word "Republic" was dropped, and as late as October 16, 1947 the representatives of the Kulja group assured the Chinese that they "have never employed direct or indirect, secret or open methods to

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

raise the question of Sinkiang seceding from the Chinese Republic." In addition to disavowing any intention of secession Akhmedjan stated that:

> The problem today is to confirm national unity and to put into effect a democratic policy. We do not put the question of the rule of one nation or group of nations over another nation or group of nations. Therefore the national self-government which we desire is supreme authority in our Province under an executive power which is to be effected not only by the Uighurs or those of Turkic race, but also by the unification of all the peoples in our Province and the implementation of a democratic policy.[17]

The demand of even the most militant Uighurs seems so far to have gone no further than the preservation of their own entity within the Chinese state. A key issue has been the struggle for elections free of intimidation by the Chinese, who attempted to cow the people with assertions that "We have the atom bomb," [18] and that "80,000 American troops" would come to establish "order" in Sinkiang.[19] Another demand has been for national courts adapted to the local needs of the population. The issue of the use of their own language also looms large in the eyes of the Uighurs. Item Three of the abortive Kulja Agreement provided that both Chinese and Uighur were to be used in all official documents, and that petitions from the people were to be in the language of the petitioner. Item Four provided that education in lower and middle schools was to be in the language of the student, that the study of Chinese was to be obligatory in middle schools, and that higher education was to be either in Chinese or in Uighur, according to the convenience of the student.

These items suggest the emphasis which Uighur nationalists, like those of other minority groups in Sinkiang, place on their cul-

[17] *Şin Çaŋ Gezeti*, February 19, 1947 (in Uighur).
[18] *Loc. cit.* (in Uighur).
[19] *Şin Çaŋ Gezeti*, Feb. 12 and 13, 1947 (in Uighur).